NEW TECHNOLOGIES AS SOCIAL PROBLEM (A Reflection on the History the Social Role of Technology) by Hronszky, Imre
?ERiODJC.~ POLYTECHNiC.·-!. SEH. soc. A!,';D .\fAt.TAG. seI. VOL. 4-. ~VO. 2, ?P. 125-148 (1996) 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES AS SOCIAL PROBLEM 
(A Reflection on the History the Social Role 
Technology) 1 
Imre HRONSZKY 
I nstitu te of Social Sciences and Economics 
Department of Theory of Science and History of Engineering 
Technical L'niversity of Budapest 
H-l.521 Budapest. Hungary 
Fax: + 36 1 463-:3473 
Received: Sept. L 199.5 
Revised: Oct. 10. 1996 
Abstract 
The recent technological revolution raises concerr:s, too. Looking for the roots of techno-
logical progress the article an overview of the ideas on the social role of technology 
in history. The article ends with the criticism of instrumentaiistic approaches to techno-
logical growth. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a technological revolution recently, the omnipresence of which is 
already experienced both in production and everyday life. This revolu-
tion realises or promises a lot for mainkind by contributing to the solu-
tion of basic social problems through producing goods, improving health. 
Mankind has never witnessed a technological breakthrough of this mea-
sure. But there is a growing awareness of very deep problems arising from 
this technological growth. Following a long historical period of trust in 
and enthusiasm for technological growth, now there is much more con-
cern, there is a bivalent approach in evaluating the recent events and the 
future possibilities. Moreover, huge masses begin to identify the danger 
1 This paper is a part of a lecture given at the summer course in San Sebastian, 1994 
directed by:\"o l'rsua and I. Hronszky, on: :\"ew Technologies, are they tools of solving 
social problems or of enhancing risks? The support given by OTKA helped to realise the 
research. 
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of developing hazardous technologies and lack of their security (or at least 
its feeling), the growing scepticism regarding industrial growth continued, 
a critical attitude toward the social meaning of technological growth as a 
whole, leading to the call for a 'sustainable development', are elements of 
an overall criticism. 
Empirical sociology shows that issues of technology became one of the 
major events people are concerned about in leading industrial countries. 
Technological growth, or at least its understanding, currently seems to be 
deeply schizophrenic. This deep divide in the interpretation of technology 
can often be found even in the fluctuation of one person's opinion from one 
to the other extreme. 
These extremes in everyday evaluation of technology are reflected in 
scientific investigation to the problems of technology in society. This in-
vestigation has been moving into two basic directions, with a \'leak bridge 
between them. One type of researches only focuses on nothing but the 
acceleration and effectivity of technological growth, like most innovation 
studies, the other type tries to concentrate on the well experienced and 
the possible harmful effects in highly critical manner. Both recent revolu-
tionary growth in technological capacities promising new social possibilities 
as well as the unsolved problems of threatening harmful effects, and espe-
cially the tension bet-Neen these two, make technology a candidate for an 
important and enduring political debate. 
There is pressure for the analysis and evaluation of the social mean-
ing of technological grovith we have been facing in modern history, and to 
explore in the direction of technological development in the future. The 
magnitude and complexity of this analysis require a comprehensive investi-
gation, which would include the cooperation of much specialized expertise, 
from different natural and social sciences to different sorts of humanities. 
This need of new types of analysis stimulates the emergence of new sciences 
such as environmental economics and even ;,,,-hen the 
solution of the ne-vv task forces it to a deep restructuring, it is also sure that 
the cognitive problem is by far not just an extension of economic think-
ing, as many claim. Arising from a prevailing overall 'instrumentalistic' 
approach to any social problem would be one of the possible tempting but 
damaging shortcuts in the investigation to reduce the approach to an ex-
tension of calculation of costs and a more effective management (including 
legal regulation) of technological growth. 
The problems with technological growth beCJme comprehensive now. 
They awake the need for criticism not only in relation to the recently quickly 
deepening environmental deterioration but to the social purposes of this 
technological growth and the changes that occur in the meanings of so-
cial relations, in the human relations to-nature and in individual human 
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behaviour, through their 'technologisation' (their technological reconstruc-
tion). Therefore, more than extended economics and management science, 
a comprehensive reestimation of the role of technology in society and nature 
is needed. The appropriate task can perhaps be an overall reorientation of 
all the sciences and humanities which concern with and are concerned for 
issues of the technology-society( nature) relationship, including disciplines 
on the human individual. 
Both history and philosophy of technology have a task in these needed 
investigations. A philosophically oriented historical overview of the role of 
technology in society can moderately contribute to this necessary knowl-
edge fund, too. This introductory presentation tries to supply some ele-
ments of a of this account. The main parameters to be followed in our 
historical overVie\il are: the and direction of _knOVI1edg'e m 
technology, the expectations toward technology concerning its social role 
and the changing role technology has in society. 
20 Re.m.arks on the Periods of Antiquity and lvIodern Ti.m.es 
An overall historical look at the role of technology in society can be given 
through a triadic ciassification. Accordingly, there was a special type of 
technology and its role in society in antiquity, best expressed by the Greek 
term'techne'. Beginning from the late medieval times, actually in modern 
time, a new type of technology was gradually emerging. It is difficult to give 
it an appropriate English name. In German there is the term 'Technik' and 
I shall use 'empirical technology' in this presentation to identify this special 
sort of technology in history. VVith this one can contrast a third historical 
type by introducing the term 'science based technology' or 'technoscience' 
for our time, for the more or less scientifically constructed technologies.2 
The Greeks referred to some alleged trickiness in the activity of crafts-
men when they spoke about 'techne'. It was thought that the objects be-
haved in contradiction to the intentions of the human users, they resisted 
them. According to the interpretation, the artisan was a peculiar sort of 
human being, able to find the way to nature's objects, which were assumed 
to be some sort of living beings, normally following their own intentions. 
His power was not to force nature to obey him (this was the 'power' of the 
magician) but to 'trick it out'. Technological reconstruction of objects of 
nature was believed some sort of constraint. Natural objects have their way 
normally but some people can have an impact on them and change their 
2Classifications and terms are not innocent. of course. They always turn the atten-
tion to some feature(s) and distract the attention from some other features of the issue 
under scrutiny. 
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normal behaviour. Technology in the form of 'techne' was identified as 
some sort of subjective capacity closely bound to the artisan. Rules could 
help on a moderate way only, for the objects behaved rather individually 
(compared to the standardized objects of technoscience!), and beyond the 
rules the individual skill of the master was always very important. 
Oriented toward preservation of the achievements acquired by a quasi-
Darwinistic, spontaneous evolution of technology, the main spirit of crafts-
manship was not inventory, it was conservative. There was no organized 
social type of action like experimentation to regularly provide new knowl-
edge and its condensation into rules. Rules emerged from a long sponta-
neous practice. When rules were found they were preserved and the need 
for preservation hindered any systematical search for new situations and 
new rules to generalise knowledge from individual situations. Technology 
developed very slowly, through constraints from the outside, which forced 
the masters to accommodate to new situations. 
To sum up, one can say that, according to the ancient type of in-
terpretation, something living and subjective met something of the same 
nature in a technological activity. Technology as techne was not seen as an 
activity reconstructing basic natural conditions of human activity but as a 
human capacity for realising human purposes by living with and accommo-
dating to nature. Technology was strongly conservative, oriented to-ward 
preservation of the 'tricks' and rules found by chance. 
First the 14th century gave birth to an idea for technological growth 
as a conscious need and subject of pride in renections on mining. This idea 
of technological growth was associated to the idea of social progress. It can 
be seen as a secularisation of the Christian idea of moving toward God's 
imperium in history. People began to put their trust in technology for 
redemption from poverty or to get rich. In modern times the idea of tech-
nological as steady basis to social progress became gradually one 
of its characteristic lQ<::ologlCiil self- reflections. in the 17th 
century and \yas fully developed the second half of the 19th century 
when the industrialisation ideologies assigned a central position to techno-
logical growth. Technological growth was transformed as industrialisation 
ideology by the self-renection to an exogenous variable, an outer necessary 
condition of social progress. 
The persuasion that slowly begun to gro\v from the 14th century, that 
mankind can continuously and endlessly widen its technological power over 
nature, was based on successfully progressing work of artisans, of course. 
Like techne in the antiquity, this technology was based on empirical knowl-
edge, it is true, but gradually on an empirical knowledge that was partly 
gathered in new ways. The 16th century gave proof to a triumphal pro-
cess of widespread and continuous inventive activity and the cumulation of 
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technical inventions. One of the most important factors was the inclusion 
of systematic experimentation. (Let us refer to the metallurgists or the 
medical doctors, who looked for new medicines, for many of different ar-
tisanships.) A principal resource of wealth began to be seen transforming 
natural things through the artisans' work. Generalised to an ideology of 
the work of artisans, in protestant interpretations all was supported by the 
idea that human beings have a task from God to finish his work. 
An upgraded acknowledgment of alchemy and the importance at-
tributed to it in the renaissance was exaggerated expression of the new 
consciousness. The alchemist magician became one of the key figures in 
the self-image of this epoch. Being able to experimentally explore the se-
crets of nature, as it was supposed, the alchemist symbolised the self-trust 
In the neVi natLiTe:-t:ral1SJ[OI"ming capacltv of mankind. 
For many reasons, among vlhich the rapid development of the arts 
-,vas only one, the empirical knowledge of nature in a suddenly and unex-
pectedly widening world (think only of the geographical discoveries) began 
to rapidly attain higher cognitive status, together with a growing tension. 
The new empirical knowledge was found in strong contrast to left knowl-
edge and their acquirement methods. The ability to know things began 
to get a profound reconsideration by the end of the 16th century, and the 
(non-educated) artisan, referring to his successful material practi~e, began 
to challenge the university scientists in issues of knowledge of natural pro-
cesses. 3 In contrast to the old type in antiquity, the techne, in this new 
historical period regular efforts were already made in different types of arts 
to widen this empirical, rule-based-knowledge. The idea of cognition by 
transforming things, too, and not only an 'empirical turn' began. Technol-
ogy, however, was mostly based on trial and error type experimentation. 
Except for mechanics in construction of scientific tools, 'theories' very sel-
dom gave more than a very vague orientation until the end of the 18th 
century, even much later. 
There is an important development in the ideologies of technological 
power from the early 17th century with Fr. Bacon. In an effort to overcome 
the inherited opposition of crafts, based on purely empirical knowledge, 
and the scholastic sciences, Bacon prophesized human progress based on 
a new type of natural science and of technological inventions, themselves 
the results of the application of the (new) science. These inventions would 
make nature's powers regularly utilisable for human purposes, gradually 
3Perhaps the most famous of these was when Bernardo Palissy, the potter, who 
challenged the scholars of Sorbonne in the second half of the 16th century to compare 
their knowledge. He claimed that, notwithstanding that he was untaught. he new more 
and more valuable than the scholars in empirical issues of the real world. Ylore than he 
insisted on having a more valuable kno'l,viedge. 
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approaching the complete mastery of nature. He predicted a new age in 
history in which natural science would take the lead, to initiate developing 
technology. He formulated with this the very idea of a scientific technology, 
that still is only under partial realisation. He was persuaded that science 
consists of, first of all, the well established methods of research, of discov-
ery. Against the widespread belief in the secret 'inventive activity' of the 
alchemists, Bacon argued for a methodical empirical research leading to 
laws of nature as the basis of advancing the utilisation of nature. With 
modern times nature became object of utilisation and scientific technology 
the appropriate tool for this. 
Bacon, attempting to give guide how to conquer nature, was exag-
gerated by his ideas of methodical research. Orienting his methodologism 
as knowledge of verbally communicable rules against any 'secret' activ-
ity, like alchemy, he thought that the true methodology can easily, quasi-
mechanically lead to new inventions. Expressing a ne,,! consciousness, of 
which Bacon represented, the late 17th century was full of promises, how, 
through methodical research, easy inventions will be realised and make the 
people wealthy.4 The Baconian vision was a new type of science based 
technology, too, having important social role, not only a 'new science'. 
Ridiculing the magicians and alchemists, Bacon fought for acceptance 
of his principie: 'natura parendo vincitur', that nature can only be 'con-
quered' by obeying its laws. Remember the subjective capacity to make 
tricks against nature's objects, understood as active subjects themselves, 
"vas the frame of referring technology in its techne period, ;,,,There constraint 
always meant some strong limit to technological capacity, human activity 
was conceptualised as accommodation to nature. The exaggerated picture 
of magicians having the key to the secrets of the objects completed this 
reflection on the work of artisans, interpreting craftsmanship in terms of 
subjective ability (and at least partial secrecy), including the possibility of 
commanding to nature 'without any limit, in principle. The need for the 
exploration of the necessities and the recognition of the real, not only imag-
ined, freedom of manipulation by obeying nature became the ontological 
and epistemological basis to the success story of progressive 'conquering' 
of nature through technological development from the 17th century. As 
it became commonplace, knowledge of nature and the growing exactness 
of natural science opened a limitless perfection of technology transforming 
nature into a servant of mankind. And nature itself seemed an endless 
417th century was already a feverish triai to make a fortune, just as improve upon 
the human conditions by technical inventions. It is much less important here that all this 
was much more an ideology of inventive activity than a real success. The disappointment 
with this inventor ideology led, early 18th century, to the sarcastic humour of the Gulliver 
onthe Royal Society's activity. 
reserVOlr of possible resources. It seemed to be possible to gain these re-
sources endlessly out of nature if its laws \vere obeyed to. The scientific 
engineer became the secularized inheritor of the alchemist, in this relation. 
He seemed to be able to realize what was historically dreamt of, because 
the knowledge of laws of nature narrowing down the predictive capacity 
seemed to be the limit to the transforming activity. 
This second part of the history of technological development and its 
id'eologies became the triumph of the 'homo faber' idea: of mankind, able to 
'domesticate' nature v,-ithout limits, by exploring naturalla'ws and obeying 
them, conceptualising nature itself as being just a passive subject of its 
technological reconstruction. The real meaning of any enduring resistance 
of natural 0h,P,-'" to their tec!lncrlogl,:al re':OJl1st;ru expEcnenced so far, 
was identified as nothing but a misguided action, based on a naive technical 
activity when to act against natural lav,rs. Nature seemed to have 
sabmitted itself to its fate of ge'ttlng transformed to taste if its la\vs '\fere 
followed, 
The trust in this 'domestication' of natural forces based on the 
progress of science predicted a calculable and planned future. This inter-
pretative framevlOrk, that mankind is ceaselessly moving through 
technological progress, from its nature-given state to a world of self-con-
sciously constructed conditions of human life, emerged in the 17th century. 
But it became the ruling one only in the 19th and the first half of the 20th 
century. This (non-critical) idea of progress had its root beside science. 
and later in economy, first of all, in technology. 
It is important that the only real limit to human technological activity 
was identified in nature itself, in its natural laws. There was no thought to 
the possible limits of technological activity to be set by the acting human 
beings themselves, e.g. to the meaningfulness, of the presumed endlessly 
progressing technological reconstruction of nature in the long run. Ro-
manticism, emerging mostly from the end of the 18th century, and forceful 
only for a short time, who offered conservative criticism on industrialisa-
tion, was quickly ignored as non-important comment on the triumph of the 
progressive reconstruction of the natural world into an artificial one. These 
reflections could easily be dismissed in the countries where the industrial 
revolution began to run. There was no chance to look backward in a his-
torical period when those strata which formed the type of society by an 
overweight, were committed to technological growth, no chance to argue 
for the preservation of earlier values and modes of life. They could suc-
cessfully be pushed back to the private sphere, as subjective, e,g. artistic 
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reflections on technological growth without a real critical account to the 
'real', economic and political world of this growth:s 
The idea of gradually completing mastery of the natural environment 
through advancement of the new science was developed as early as the 
beginning of the 17th century. The industrialisation ideology from the 
mid-19th century added something important to this belief. This is that 
continuous technological growth is some sort of necessity. One sort of 
technological determinism appeared in the reflections on society. There is 
no place here even to enumerate the variety of 'technology deterministic' 
ideas in different social theories. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to point 
out that it ranged from a naturalisation of human history (based on the 
idea of the reificating conception of a somehow natural-law-like growth 
of technology as the fate to mankind, somehow from outside) to ideas in 
which technological determinism meant something different. According to 
these, solving social problems preconditions technological growth. In the 
ideological reflexes to changing social (and natural) world through indus-
trialisation technology became the moving force of social progress, either as 
a fatelike outer factor or a precondition, on which the social forces should 
be concentrated first, if social progress has been be realised. 
One of the later elements of the technology deterministic industriali-
sation ideology is an interpretation of invention with the so-called 'techno-
logical imperative', an idea, perhaps typical around the mid-20th century. 
This 'technological imperative' can be formulated in descriptive and nor-
mative ways. According to the descriptive version technological inventions 
necessarily go through. According to the normative formulation, no control 
should be practiced over the inventing activity from 'outside'. Mankind has 
fully to explore (and utilise?) the technological potential available. (The 
pr,:>gl:eSSlflg self-realisation of rnc:.nkind~ the young 
Marx clairned ~o 
action tov."ard nature as a Inain enlancipatorical forCe for il1ankind. to his 
understanding. history of technology is the appropriation of nat ure by Tl1ankind in a 
double process of mutual mediation of objectification of the capacities acquired through 
the appropriation of nature and appropriation itself. It leads, he hoped, to the perfect 
'naturalisation' of the human being on the one to the eyer progressing 'societalisation' of 
nature on the other end of the interaction of the human being with nature. The history 
0; industrialisation and the recent development of technology (including the application 
of high-tech to social relations and individual psyche) surely requires another approach. 
too. According to this, technoscience is only a successful development of instrumental 
control capacities, a reyolutionary step in its instrumental efl1cacy. The philosophical-
antropological idea of emancipatory power of technology does not exciude at all the neutral 
or critical historical sociological views on technology as a control tool having a strong 
transforming, an instrumentalising effect on the social relations and indiyid ual behaviour, 
and \'ice versa. of course. The recent technological revolution is probably a mixture of 
both tendencies, running in both directions. 
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technological imperative has a less philosophical but more empirical, so-
cial science justification as well, when it is argued that economic growth 
is based on technology and cannot or should not be stopped.) The idea of 
'technological imperative' fits into a special type of thinking about partial 
issues in society: according to this it is rational when any segment of society 
regulates itself to maximise its own purpose. The inclusion of its products 
into the social whole will be considered and regulated at the outcomes, in 
the so called 'application context' as an end-of-the-pipeline regulation in a 
selection and rectification process. 
Understanding of any social activity in means-ends terms slo'wly be-
came prevailed through the social transformation of feudalism to capitalist 
It liberated the end-setting "rr""ru of society, (in principle) from 
any social structural and lCieolo.:,?;lC:al hindrc:nces. 'C:ornmercial "r-rnT1T" and 
technology were good basis and empirical models to this interpretation. In 
some ideologies by the end of the 18th century calculation became syn-
onym to the rationality. (The prepositivistic ideology, that became the 
basic framework to establish the nev; Ecole Politechnique in Paris during 
the French revolution by 1994, made this identification first for higher ed-
ucation. The practical consequence was an introduction of a very strong 
mathematical education to make calculations by solving equations, where 
it was already possible (the smaller part of engineering activity to this 
time) and moreover (!), to educate the students to be calculating human 
beings, giving them this type of culture for their life, so that they became 
accustomed to consider everything by looking for and taking into account 
any possible quantitative information.) 
From the mid-19th century the industrialisation spread from the craft 
to other fields of \V-ork. One example from the second half of the 19th 
century is the rapid and widespread dissemination of artificial fertilisation, 
itself the first element and symbol of the beginning industrial reconstruction 
of agricultural activity. V\lith chemistry as a basis, artificial fertilisation was 
the first science based technological activity in agriculture. 
For a meaningful philosophical and historical-sociological analysis of 
technology, one can find an interesting grasp when comparing the role 
artificial fertilisation had for about one hundred years long and our well 
based fear after this 'success'. This type of analysis begins by stating the 
necessarily ambivalent nature of any technology, or to put it differently: 
any technology shows earlier or later its negative effects, too, and there is 
a chance that these become the prevailing ones on the long run. 
One can illustrate a rather strong variant of the thesis on the ambiva-
lent nature of any human intervention into natural relations by referring to 
agriculture, as a case. The first agricultural activities, needed on the long 
run correcting technologies. In the long series of these correcting actions 
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artificial fertilisation was included by the mid-19th century. Technologies 
were to be changed in history because it threatened that the 'side-effects', 
necessarily belonging to any technological innovation, in agricultural activ-
ity, on the long run, began to turn down the main ones. Agriculture shows 
a continuous story of correcting activities toward any historical type of it, 
if this run already for a while. 19th century agriculture, after shorter run 
successes in intensification of the utilisation of the fields, begun to turn 
over to sho\ving failures, exhaustion of the soil, moving toward an overall 
crisis. An additional activity, artificial fertilisation cured the problem for 
a while. But on the long run just this activity became the main source of 
problems. Looking at the causes of this turn-over one can find a necessary 
lack of human knowledge .• L'I~ny activity can only be based on a finite model 
of the natural issues to be reconstructed. This finiteness of knowledge and 
ontological reasons, too, should be taken into account 'when explaining the 
ambivalence of technologies to human purposes. 
VVe now face a recent turn to biologisation. A type of 'accompanying 
research', set from the beginning of the ne'?! orientation, could perhaps 
help to recognise some sort of inflexion point earlier than the accumulation 
of negative effects begins to force us to this recognition. Instead, at the 
moment, one can face a repeated, one sided orientation toward the new 
as if it were the long expected panacea. The frame of the comparison, 
the critical rhetoric is nearly exclusively set tmvard the old method, the 
artificial fertilisation. For ideological reasons a one sided interpretation is 
given to a new, but someho'\v once again one-sided technology, instead of 
developing an accompanying continuous critical consciousness. 
Despite the of the harmful side of technological grmvth in 
the ideological reflections on it, during the early industrialisation period, it 
actually caused a lot of harmful effects, e.g. on human health, on the envi-
ronment, etc. of course. In the 19th being an especially rude 
of Intfi)(!uc:l1J,g te(:n'[10iO;2)c;S into social the harmful ef-
fects were much more immediate and were more carelessly dealt with than 
can be today, at least mostly in the industrially leading countries. 6 
The typical identification of all this was that these are (perhaps necessary) 
'side-effects' of the technological progress. The naming of the issue with 
the term 'side-effect' already worked as rhetoric, suggesting both the ne-
cessity of the named both that it could be only the transitional price for 
6To refer one case. the utilisation of cornrnon salt for producing natriuD1 for soap 
production, a very important achie,'erncnt for society had the consequence that, after its 
first industrial realisation. hydrocloroc acid was simply released into the air for about fifty 
years. It had devastating effect on the agricultural surrounding. The 'a!cali-bill limiting 
this in the early 1840s can be seen as thee firts state regulation activity for en\'ironmental 
protection. 
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progress, to be put an end to it by extending the rationality of technological 
invention. 
To summarize some features that ruled the ideologies over technolog-
ical activity in the 19th century, one was a belief in endlessly progressing 
technological reproduction of any natural relation as a rational activity 
(both in the meaning of calculability and of human meaningfulness). An-
, b h" I 'd "r> d·./-· . I I otHer one was t ,at tec. nologlCa, 'was 1 entme, wILh so CIa progress. 
Typical technologies of the 19th least in its first part, were still 
based on methodical-exnerimental research, on a lower level of 
engineering and not on scientific research. 'Therefore, most of the credit, 
given to the technicalisation of natural relations as 
. , 
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characteristic feature. 
'This is the third 
in the industrialisation 
focused very narrowly 'In industrial goals and the harmful effects caused 
by industrialisation "were not dealt with or their regulation began to limp 
very slowly after the introduction of technologies. 
As an of the belief in technology as basis of social progress 
in the early 20th century the engineer became a cultural symbol in the de-
veloped industrial countries, especially in America. Many silent films took 
the engineer as their hero. Some general intention of society to change 
the nature-given relations by the work of engineers was expressed in them. 
N e\v dams, crossing valleys, built up in the first third of the 20th century 
in Colorado, illustrated how mighty mankind became in reconstructing na-
ture, just as skyscrapers did. The task of realising of engineering phantasy 
gave a new definition to technological progress. Some social scientists went 
further. They began to identify the main problems in conduct of society 
as a lack of 'engineering of society' already around the turn of the century. 
Th. Veblen, then Dewey conceptualised the idea of 'social engineering', the 
technocratic movement in the 305 tried to gain social support to this idea, 
to realise, they claimed, a step needed already long again social progress. 
So, technocracy claimed two closely related theses. According to one, 
technology meant regulation and the experienced lack of regulation of social 
relations meant social technology was missing, the capacity of forming and 
organizing social issues in analogy to issues in nature, the original place 
of technology. According to the other, engineers should take the leading 
7A comparati\'e look at the successi\'e world exhibitions in the 19th century can 
shm<: how later the competition among the nations 2.nd progress of mankind became 
expressed in technological terms and in terms of growth. in capacities to do something 
quicker, bigger. ete. \Vorld exhibitions until recently continued to reflect on and prolong 
the feeling that social progress is to be measured by technological growth. 
S Actually the chemistry of artificial fertilisers and the organic dying industry plus 
the electric industr~' originated in pre\'ious scientific tesearch in the 19th century, 
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role in political bureaucracy, partly because technology became the main 
factor in social change and partly because social issues should be handled 
as objects of (regulatory) technology, to make them effective. Engineers 
were to be seen, par excellence, the appropriate people to realise these tasks 
- according to the technocratic ideology. 9 
It is meaningful to touch upon the socialist interpretations of technol-
ogy as a tool of solving social problems. All these interpretations, notwith-
standing whatever political specificity they were, agreed on the basic im-
portance of accelerating technological growth as means of social progress. 
One of which the effect on the social practice of the later socialist states 
was not important but it is theore";;ically interesting, nevertheless, was a 
leftish 'messianistic dogmatism', to lend the term of Gy. Lukacs for this 
issue. This dreamed, among others, of a specifically socialist type of tech-
nology, which should have realised an opposite type of unification of the 
viOrker and the object of labour in the process of labour than the, at the 
beginning of the 20th century just emerging Taylorism did, vlhich reduced 
the need for the skills of the labourer to the extreme. Led by the request of 
an 'emancipatory' relation of the worker to its labour through a ne\'i type 
of organisation of the labour process, its most famous representative, Bog-
danovi developed some quite modern thoughts on the effective utilisation 
of the workers knowledge for improving the labour process. 
The ideology of technology which became realised in practice of the 
socialist states, by the 'buroeaucratic dogmatism', to lend the other term 
of Lukacs, utilised him to name the opposite ideological and political 
approaches in socialist mO\'ellH:nt, ,vas ripprliv modernist, that means a sort 
of short-sighted industrialism as a legacy of the 19th century. 'bureau-
cratic dogmatism' industrialisation was seen as the sufficient basis for solv-
ing social problems under the control of the state. Growth of technology 
meant the gro'\ving amount of goods and symbolised calculative planning 
Illake the nev,,:" social systeul more effective than 
the market system, reconstructing the w"hole society into a production and 
consumption system regulated overall planning activity and control of 
the state. Concerning the problem of technological growth, as in any other 
relation, the socialist system extinguished the counterbalancing power oI, 
at least some sort of, democracy to the modernist project and its narrow 
minded growth orientation. All this led to a type of technological, indus-
trial culture, in which environmental poilution, extinction of resources and 
90 nly one (,S president has been with engineering career so far. Taken into account 
the nuclear engineering studies of J" Carter this number grew to one a half. One can 
wonder about the lack of social persuasive power of technocratic movement in taking 
account this fact, too. 
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enslaving the worker into des killed work to the extreme, far overcame its 
. 1·· .. 10 capIta IstlC ongm.-
A look back in history on the legitimation speeches of technological 
growth in the modernisation period \vas made. The basis for comparison 
of the effects of technological action was the past: either bringing natural 
forces under social control was contrasted to natural forces, having earlier 
an uncontrolled effect on society or the individual human being, or the 
meaningfulness of all this Vias denied in the name of preserving an earlier 
way of life. For most people the future of technology seemed to be the 
end uring progress of reconstructing and controlling nature in interest of 
mankind. Nature Vlas not problematized as an object of human activity 
when reproduced by and into technologies, nor the question, if meaningful-
ness 01 tecn.n()lc)gisati()n of future "nr;PTV both of the socia.l relations and 
the individuum, is limitless, was asked. Technology was seen as a social 
tool and the assumed limitless calculability, predictability of technological 
action gave meaning and security for mankind and gave the belief of the 
realisability of any technological action toward nature. 
3. )vel'CCHrll!lg the I'vIodernisation Period? 
The Instrm::nentalistic AD1:>rO::'tc.ll to the Pl'oblelllS 
Technology continuously realised more and more of its promises in the last 
centuries, bringing us to a new, rather comprehensive technological revolu-
tion, based on scientific research, in the last thirty years. Concerning this 
recent revolution one can enumerate biotech, informatics and computer 
industry, materials science, psychology or management science, medical 
technologies, or just space industry as a comprehensive item: one can find 
new technological capacities everywhere. On the one hand the earlier idea, 
laThe socialist system gave a fa\·ourable political milieu to one-sided technologi-
cal projects, in which several times, alongside the usual short range technological and 
economic purposes, longterm, overall technological dreams were the leading ideas. One 
case C8n be especially illuminating concerning the missing counter-balances to some 'bold' 
ideas. The idea of re\·ersing the course of some rivers originated in Canada, in the 40s. 
But it never got an appropriate support, for the obvious fear of the possible consequences. 
Better to say, the lack of appropriate knowledge of the consequences stopped it. But 
Stalin fou:1d it a task worthy of the efforts of a centralized, socialist state. The later, 
softer dictatorship moved much in the same way. Orienting toward narrow minded short 
range technological projects in general, it changed se';eral times for one sided long term 
endeavours, suffocating their democratic negotiation, building this way the future social 
dramas into the technological systems. 
llSome philosophers, like Heidegger disputed this and argued that inclusion of 
natural forces into human activity brings with itself the danger of some sort of dark, 
uncontrollable forces and hence an uncontrollable future. 
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which was partly a hope until now, became a large real potential: tech-
nologies based on new, breakthrough developments of sciences are rapidly 
becoming typical and the recent technological development promises a fuller 
realisation of important social purposes than at any time. 12 One part of 
the modernisation project, inclusion and development of newer natural ca-
pacities for serving the mankind seems reinforced. 
But it does not need a long time either to describe how the so called 
'side-effects' of industrial growth became one of the most serious social 
problems in our time. The very rapidly accelerating industrial growth in 
the last period, after the second world war, extended the 'side-effects', too, 
in an accelerated way and made the problems of 'side-effects' globaL The 
accelerating tendency to rapid destruction of natural resources of civilisa-
tion, by continuing the type of industrial growth so far, made obvious the 
short-sightedness of the ind ustrialisation ideology and the lack of economic 
and legal regulation mechanisms. 
Recent technological growth shows a sort of schizophrenia and an 
open polarisation concerning the evaluation of its possibilities, even when 
one approaches the evaluation question purely instrumentally. The term 
'purely instrument ally' is used to refer to an approach in which the meaning 
of technological growth is not questioned and therefore any criticism is 
oriented only toward achieving (a safe) grov;th, in 'which the problem is 
identified as one of methods. the importance of criticisms toward 
the human meaning of technological grO'wth as a whole or some special 
technologies will be dealt later.) 13 
Four types of problems are usuaily mentioned as the most important 
ones. The first one is the rapidly deterioration of environment. 
Environmental pollution caused non-appropriately developed technolo-
gies and the problem of hazardous w'aste already has a global dimension. 
latior:. Let us 
presupposes the others. 
this H:-
lec:iHloiogy will be 
revolutionised. The sciences :n the forefront need TO their PUffJoses the e ... "olution of others 
and they an aid to the others. The case for micromechanics could be an example. 
for many experts eyaluate that it is to rnake a .:;i;nilar jurnp as rnicroelectron-
ics in the last 30 years. itself b,ised OIl the evolution in microelectronics. among 
oth~rs. This jump promises ,'ery important progress in medicine. among a lot of fields of 
application. 
13'To give a sin1ple case to differentiate bet'ween the t\\"O types of criticisrl1 one can 
call in mind the problem of 'rent-an-uterus'. the problem of 'wage mother'. For some, it 
is nothing but a problem to solve safely. that means it is a problem of method. for others 
it is to be opposed on ground of basic value commitments, that means it is a problem 
of purpose. Problems relevant for medical ethics are trivial cases where an obvious value 
plurality accompanies technological development but many other fields show the same 
feature. 
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The other one is the depletion of (some types of) resources, a threatening 
problem already in the near future. The third problem is that mankind 
must understand that there are some natural limits not to overcome by 
technologies. The problem of global warming can be first mentioned here. 14 
This later problem shows especially clearly how misleading is to tranquilise 
ourselves concerning the harmful effects of technologies by labelling them 
as 'side-effects,.15 Some sort of natural limits are already found, in connec-
tiyn to human reconstructing activity. The fourth type of problems arises, 
paradoxically, from the grmving effectivity and the deeper level of effects of 
technology has effects on nature nowadays. It is the problem of the possible 
1· h' rr I ( b \ d b h . . 16 non- mear, c_aotlc errects \to e) cause Y new tec _nologles on nature.-
One can recognize that these problems are the effects of full-fledged 
of the modernisation idea as the lC<:1,UH1." behind indus-
trialisation. All the mentioned types of problems attack ideas taken as 
preliminary suppositions earlier. The first is about 'side-effects', always 
of secondary importance, the second that nature was taken as, at least 
practically, inexhaustible. 17 The global ','{arming reminds us that human 
technological activity reaches the measure of the globe, as its limit to ex-
HIt is about the story that mankind with its agriculture, urbanisation, etc. accom-
D10dated itself to Cl rather stable clirnatic and natural geographic situation and a change 
in the average temperature cc_used by industrial activity would cause overall climatic and 
geographic changes like the raise of the le\'el of seas, the change of weather zones. etc. All 
this would challenge in all unbearable measure. The neglected ·side-effect'. cumulation of 
carbondioxide in the at rnosphere begins to be the main industrial effect. 
l5S mall 'side-effects' 'can som;times cumulate in unbelievable measure and become 
the 'rl1<tin' ones. Any 'exact' calculation of costs of a technological investment made earlier 
without counting the long-run effects can mislead and simply shows how much the ;exact' 
economic calculations are issues of choices of wh?"t should be calculated. They actually 
are the results of some sort social consensus on what should be calculated. This referring 
to concensus nature of these 'objecti\'e' calculations does not mean, of course, that setting 
their limits would only be a matter of negotiation. 
16The civil stratospheric flight can be seen as an appealing possibility in instru-
mental terms for it would reduce the flight time among the continents very much. The 
solution of this problem needs a concentration of the O\'erall technological capacity and 
its purposeful development. One of the reasons for this technological project in Germany 
is this, because it can give an overall direction to technological innovation. But there is 
also a very well founded concern about the possible effects on the stratosphere for there 
scarcely is knowledge anilable about the beha\-iour of stratosphere. It shows a growing 
new type of awareness and its translation into research terms that the so called Sanger 
project, itself intending the solution of the reliable flight until 2020 includes from the very 
beginning a research on the possible ;side-effects', 
liThe first recorded case when a bird disappeared from the biosphere was in the 
17th century in :\ladagaskar. The new 'sustain ability' approach intends to fight against 
any annihilation of resources for the future generations. It seems to be questionable if a 
stronger variant of this thesis can be validated. even when intended destruction can be 
dismissed. Industrial reconstruction of the natural cor,ditions of human life. it seems. ha\'e 
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tend it in some directions and that actions always effect in a network of 
relations. This and the fear of possible chaotic effects reminds us of the 
limits of the presupposition of limitless computability of natural processes 
as predicted. 
As mentioned, criticism of technological growth can include reflection 
on the meaningfulness of the purposes, too, and calling for a different type 
of purposes or it can be reduced to an extended modernistic approach. This 
latter mainly means the extension of the scientific calculatory approach to 
the 'side-effects', too. It thinks that the problems are only based in lack of 
further knowledge of methods and not, at least some times, in some basic 
assumptions and ontological relations. 
Even the more moderate, instrumentalistic criticism can already show 
very deep problems. One of them is that the recent period of technological 
growth is mainly based on recently born ne\v technologies which, concern-
ing their safe control, force mankind to face problems of new sorts, because 
some of them can be seen as especially dangerous technologies. One of the 
possible dangers emerging through the new successes in a growing mas-
tery of nature through industrialisation and developing technoscience for 
this purpose arises from the recent quick conquering of the sphere of bi-
ology. 'vVe are now facing, through genetic manipulation, the beginning 
of engineering of life itself. As any earlier step, promising to extend hu-
man control over nature, it promises liberation from constraints in many 
directions. And genetic engineering already is well on the way to realise 
some of these promises. ls In its extrapolation, genetic engineering, applied 
to the biosphere, gives the possibility of putting the evolutionary fate of 
existing species, as well as the possibility of creating new ones at the dis-
posal of mankind. Genetic engi:rreering, pror.o.ises the revolutionisation of 
curing diseases, by intervention on the genetic level. It the possibility 
of conscious transformation, potentially extended to the whole biological 
',,;;orld. The idea of ~ evolution on a much deeper level 
than earlier and biotechnology could occur nov,,-, But this is 
a point, too, vihere mankind stumbles into one of the basic conditions that 
a consequence in reducing or even :::;ome sort of resources. even then. -",,"hen 
won't be blindly dealt with like the mpntioned bird in \ladagaskar. 
rapidly grov,:ing diagnostic capacity of caused disea.ses. nei;" bac-
ceria, working for pharmaceutical purposes, ,He just but a few exam pies. 
19'The typical yalue approaches lO the transformation of llctlUre are anthropocentric 
ones. 3Iost of them are purely instrument ally oriented. Their main question is if the 
problem at stake can be solved by some tools. There are important challenges to this 
approach based on some value-commitments, to set limit or to prohibit some sort of 
instrumental dealing with these problems. These \·alue-commitments can be anthropo-
or non-anthropocentric types. There are non-anthropocentric but biocentric approaches, 
too, esp. in environmental ethics. 
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made modern science from the early 17th century to what it is today. Let 
us make some remarks on this problem. 
Agriculture together with industry in the late centuries reproduced a 
comprehensive 'second nature'. This had a strong effect on the biosphere, 
by forcing species to accommodate to the new conditions set by human 
activity, but concerning the genetic code it had a shallow effect on the en-
vironment, non-comparable with the alleged emerging possibility of genetic 
engineering on biological evolution. 
In contrast to earlier agricultural effects it is already possible to con-
struct 'artificial beings' by controlled genetic manipuiation but there is not 
enough knmvledge of their possible effects on the biosphere, comparable 
to the of their creation. To escape this problem of 
life-scienCe there is 2. choice in as follovls. One possi-
bility is to folIo;,v the technique of dealing with highly dangerous artificial 
products, already well known in physics and chemistry, and to a 
new of laboratory science and technology, developing and preserv-
ing well-controlled artificial co:uditions for the new biological technology. 
But another appealing direction is to develop a genetic engineering which 
works in nature itself, under spontaneous conditions, like most chemical 
and physical technologies. This brings the problem of the so-cailed envi-
ronmental release. Scientists are only at the very beginning of research in 
this direction, knowing how genetically produced beings would behave in a 
non-artificial environment. In some new types of experiments parts of the 
natural environment are modelled to reach a mediating stage. 
Time and diversity \vere two parameters for natural evolution to ac-
commodate to conditions, science has to find something to account for 
their effect in the selection process as a technological parameter to be able 
to include human planning a.ctivity into evolution on genetic level. There 
can be a ,vell based concern, nevertheless, that complexity puts some basic 
constraints on the intention to release into the environment of genetically 
engineered beings. 
There are other technologies giving a difficult task to the engineer 
constructors, and continuously moving the lay opinion, with the raising 
development of technologies of high catastrophic potential in the last 40 
years. To put it ostensibly, nuclear power can be one and transport of 
liquified gas another case. Contrary to genetic engineering, one mostly can 
know rather exactly what the result of any catastrophe would be. The 
safe treatment of these technologies requests a solution of reliability prob-
lems of these technologies, higher by several orders of magnitude than that 
of the usual technologies. The very basic relationship to consider this safe 
treatment is that of risk, probability and damage. Experts argue that tech-
nologies with low enough probability to cause damage are safe enough for 
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utilisation, notwithstanding their damage potential. Then the well known 
problem arising with these highly dangerous technologies is the answer to 
the question 'how· safe is safe enough?' and who should decide on this. 
Without being able to go into any detail it is worthwhile to mention, nev-
ertheless, that it can be misleading to say that the discussion is between 
neutral experts and their opponents, the lay movements (the scientific ra-
tionality and the lay irrationality) but between two committed approaches. 
Official experts have been doing investigation forming a problem sol-
uble under some special preconceptions and movements oppose these pre-
sumptions needed to the possibility of solution. It is important to under-
stand that the basic controversy between them is not a problem of more or 
less exact calculation but of value commitments leading to different evalu-
ations. There are a lot of fights between scientific rationality and massive 
illiteracy in technological affairs in discussions over dangereous technolo-
gies, it is true. And there is no excuse for illiteracy when somebody wants 
to have a say. But I want to draw the attention to something else. This 
is that real political content is mostly covered by this. One of the keys to 
identify this political content is to understand that the debate, liberated 
from the mentioned illiteracy in scientific knowledge layer, is between value 
approaches. 
Discussions over these issues, both over the biotechnology and nuclear 
technology, show a non-appropriate type of understanding of hO\,; technol-
ogy should runction in society, provided the political nature of these issues 
in a democracy would be acknO\vledged. There are many calculations and 
scientific researches made~ dealing ""vith the safety issues, true. But ll10st 
of these calculations and regulations are made without engaging into a 
genuinely political process. That means an enduring trial of reducing the 
problems or exploring and managing the effects of technologies according to 
reasonable models, developed 'without the effected people, as if this man-
Inore than a bureaucratic process l-. • uasea on 
scientific regulation, and not about people's fate having their say to it. (To 
some evidence: one point of concerns about people's rate may be that 
in the existing regulations there is no full financial compensation prescribed 
to damages, another one is that, as damages, mainly individual and not 
social costs, too, are accounted for. A third problem is how to evaluate the 
rights of people for choosing their own living conditions, that means how 
to evaluate people's right to state their fear of living near technologies with 
catastrophic potentials. The list can be enlarged without difficulties.) 
Scientific expertise may in different ways be abused for bureaucratic 
reasons and partial interests in risk assessments. Sometimes scientific cal-
culation itself as it is becomes rhetoric, covering the value commitments 
that direct its focus, declaring itself neutral and not taking into account 
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all the possible alternative calculations and evaluations to be made.2o Even 
there is a tendency for reducing scientific expertise to special types of sci-
ences, not including into the arena important social sciences.21 
All this is about expertise. But lay people, as involved ones, have a 
basic political right to have their opinion considered. In early trials vlhen 
these types of discussions were first organized there was an expectation 
of making an easier consensus this way. This was the original reason to 
organize public discussions. This expectation partly is an extension of the 
instrumentalistic expectation. now, more and more expenences shm'V 
that a consensus may not be the usual outcome of the so called consensus 
meetings and including opinion may not be too effective in solving 
the dispute this way. The reasons can be numerous. But, none of them 
IS to return to reduce the decision processes to the 
of state bureaucrats, industries involved and experts trusted the state 
alone. Instead, these meetings should clearly shmv the political 
nature of introducing hazardous technologies and should lead to genuine 
political means to solve the problems of these introductions. 
Often there is a typical case in technological public controversies, of 
which both outcomes are pro blematic: either a decision will be made with-
out lay participation justifying this by referring to their non-competence, 
a reduction of their political right in principle, or a win, over expertise, of 
massive lack of scientific understanding of the issues at stake. One way out 
of the impasse seems the inclusion of alternative expertise as a mediator. 
Because these issues are tense, due to a lack of trust in the state and the 
experts acknowledged by it, trust in the inclusion of values of the effected 
people into the calculations by experts may help to get to some sort of 
discussion arena, arguable from both sides, in which the reasons can be 
made clear at least. (More to this will be said at my third lecture of the 
summercourse. ) 
20 At least at the third level 0] assessmg risks. the level of evaluation. alternative 
\'alues should be taken into account. just because any technological action can differently 
affect people and they may have different value orientations to the issue in question. But 
more than this. a scientist has continuously to make methodological decisions on the level 
of description already and these decisions can influence the understanding of the issues to 
advantage of some and harm of others. Just think of looking for the representative case 
for generalisation of issues as a \'ery clear example. 
21 Organisational sociology \vas included into the evaluation of possible nuclear 
catastrophes first in 1979. at the investigation of the Harrisburg accident. Being obviously 
competent in analysis and evaluation of man - machine-system relations in complex tech-
nological systems organisational sociology had to fight out its place, nevertheless. Some 
hard scientists' and buroeaucrats' arrogance was to be identified in this case and was 
successfully overcome. The analysis 01' the 19,9 issue initiated Ch. Perrow to his world 
famous book on :"ormal Accidents. publi:ohed in 1986. 
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The need for regulation of technological growth through a political 
process including scientific expertise is today more and more accepted both 
by state administrations and lay people, less, of course, by industrialists. 
But it is worthwhile to mention some problems that may cool down any 
exaggerated hope in the effectivity and simple evolution of the recent or 
planned regulatory mechanisms even when they will be reconstructed as a 
genuine political process. 
One problem is with the level (and time limit) of the regulatory ac-
tions. Let me refer to some facts concerning the first. The fact that the 
fuel for cars proved to be dangerous for health and the environment led 
to the reduction of damaging materials in the combustion products. It 
diminished the amount of dangerous materials by one car, it is true, but, 
because of the growing number of cars, it did not lead to the goals it ex-
pected. Another case can be the well-known story of DDT. DDT proved 
to be a dangerous poison to be taken out of the insecticides because of 
its cumulative behaviour. The legal prohibition of the utilisation of DDT 
led the industry, among others, to look for materials that had not been 
prohibited. 22 Paradoxically enough, these usually proved to be more dan-
gerous than their predecessors. Legal regulation, based on the best wish to 
improve the situation, led to an undesirable result. 
The problems with safety of cars led designers to enhance the safety 
of newer cars. As response to this development there is now a tendency 
to drive faster due to these achievements. All these cases suggest that the 
regulating mechanisms sometimes do not \vork on levels enough and 
on appropriate manner, leaving deeper structures of economic interests and 
regulating mechanisms and individual human attitudes untouched by the 
regulatory action. They even show something more: regulatory effects on 
the non-appropriate level may move society's reaction in dangerous direc-
tions, too. 
The HC~H\ • .ulLlt'. of the et'., Ul.CH.1Vll of these TeCl1.n{)lC)gl.es seems 1 1 OaSeQ 
on a consciously chosen modernist approach, further, especially in the late 
socialist countries, in trying to keep the distance of the expert and the rest 
of the population. But in contrast to this official effort, at the same 
the setting of new technologies became a deep politicai issue 1.0 
rely only on expert calculations would mean denying this political character 
in a time, let us call it post-modern, in which people begin to be more 
sensitive toward post-material values, like want a part in political decisions. 
Experts can even produce rather persuasive arguments about the very small 
likelihood of a catastrophic issue (this is several times not the case!) but, 
22 Another way to avoid the problems of DDT caused by the legal prohibition for 
utilising DDT in developed countries has been to keep their transport to third world 
countries. 
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even then they may miss something belonging to the political nature of the 
'technological controversy'. This is that the solution must be trustable. It 
is because the whole arena misses the possibility of counter-expertise and 
the expression of the lay opinion. One way to seemingly avoid conflicts is 
to deny the political nature of the debate, as dictatorships do, which way 
does not seem the best one or to give full acknowledgment to the political 
'- - L" m' h 1 i 1 d b 23 nat-Ule 01 _._am tec.no.og.ca. e ates. 
It is just this the failure to provide simple instrumental results 
.' '-h 1 - r ' • - er"-' T -. k . h' k l' r J. to G le prooiems OT 'slde-errect-s', 1 trnn.~, L.at ma. es a ot 01 recenL war-
riors of the industrialisation project, and their careless belief in the thesis 
that means progress, rather angry. Modernism argued against ro-
manticism by defending a purely instrumentalistic approach to technology 
as social tool and a naive belief that IS to 
social progress, at least as its base, requesting that any valid comparison 
should be made, through a possibly quantitative way, by comparing this 
instrumental through calculations based on expertise. now, 
surrounded by a global problem of environmental deterioration, with more 
and more menacing time shortage for action, even earlier victorious instru-
mentalism proved itself self-defeating. vVhen the dangerous effects cannot 
be (at least practically) dismissed anymore, as it was for a long time, v'lhen 
gradually any accounting for the effects of a technology must include these, 
opening the question 'what should be seen as the main final result, the good 
effects for which technology implemented or the negative effects, perhaps 
massively threatening already?', any simplistic reference to an extension of 
expert calculations necessarily raises counter opinions. 
Clearly, no argumentation strategy is anymore justified by arguing 
the same way for any technology as it seemed during the industrialisation, 
the modernisation period. 24 One could object to this statement that tech-
nologies should not be seen as political questions. But they are actually 
for people think they are, and, as experience shows, efforts to persuade 
them about the truth of the opposite only raised the political content of 
controversies. 
23Especially poor countries may provide for a third possibility like a Hungarian 
village where the burgomaster explained their willingness to accept a waste disposal for 
they urgently needed the compensation money . .\'otice that the issue was changing the 
safety issue to buying willingness for money. a well· known issue in the practical regulation 
in hazardous work as compensated wage. By the way, it may have been the case that 
the disposal should ha,'e been accepted as safe enough but the decision was made on a 
different ground. 
2·1 All this means that no practice seems to be justified anymore when it is only 
based on economic and technological effectivity comparisons, taken economy as evaluation 
of investment costs \'ersus benefits coming from the utilisation of the technological object, 
notwithstanding the inclusion of the 'side-effects'. 
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Comparing knowledge, available to develop technology in its differ-
ent historical periods, one can see how much the knowledge base changed 
from empirical knowledge, acquired by chance, to a science based, com-
puter aided, modern knowledge base. \Ve are witnessing that this enor-
mous potential begins to be used not only to explore the means leading to 
the realisation of the technological purpose but also to the simultaneous 
exploration of possible 'side-effects,.25 One can further see, that a wider 
knmvledge base allows us to guess begins to show some sort of natural 
limits to meaningful technological action, too, and does not provide for 
possibility of on, in every direction progressing technological action. 
It seems that all this said can be comprised into the in two, opposing, 
overall approaches toward the meaning of technological development in 
society. The two conceptualisations, to be compared systematically, are 
a so-called modern age type approach and, let's say, if we do not have a, 
with highly questionable commitments less burdened terminology, a post-
modern age type, respectively. 
Modernism, as I understand it, operates with an overall instrumen-
talistic frame, with an overall means and ends rationality (including ev-
erything in nature and society), taking everything into account as issue of 
utility, with the claim of continuous extensive grmvth of consumption, and 
the idea of a universalistic and total change of the nature-given precon-
ditions of human life. The overall tendency of realizing a society, led 
means and ends rationality, makes effectiveness an overall tendency and 
the supreme value. 
This overall tendency to effectivity moves toward realizing a special 
type of hierarchical structure, based on elites of economy, politics, the 
buroeaucracy, science and technology, the specialists, and is highly demar-
cationistic toward the lay masses. Together with this, modernism is based 
on a progressing division of labour, the acknowledgement of eminence in-
side the demarcation be c~~~,~t- for SOIIlellllng SUj)':rlor in this 
meaning in con1parison to other people). according to the 
25Technology asseSSD1ent. a bureaucratically instil util)nalised explofction of 'side-
effects' and its development from science and to\\'ard a social 
conflict solving activity relying on will be handled with in my 'lext presentc"-
tion in detailed It is \\'orthv:hile to n1ention here ahead;: th2.,t some overall technological 
projects are planned to realise their goal in 20 up to 40 veal'S, A needed research on 
possible 'side-effects' emerges. planned already to continuously accompany these types of 
researches. Technology assessment as early \':arning gets new importance and must be 
made continuous. Comparing engineering with pharmaceutics \vhere a sort of ·technology 
a.ssessment' was prescribed already some hundred years ago, one can wonder why this 
exploration of 'side-effects' could not effect on engineering thinking. until the last some 
ten years. An explanation may lay in the different social entrenchment of engineering in 
comparison to pharmaceutics, 
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modernist project, through the continuous exchange of expert knowledges, 
worked out for formalised action, above the 'wide lay mass. Unified with a 
tendency from the political power, in centralised bureaucracies this project 
is moving toward the realisation of a universalistic plan, a special sort of 
rationality and appeal to 'rational' action. One of the important features 
of the modernist project is the insistence on understanding technology as 
a universalistic, hierarchical power, conceptualising it only as nothing but 
tool for rational social action. 
It seems that the still accepted modernisation thesis on the cre-
ation of conditions of production, the progressing universalisation progress 
of technicalisation of natural issues makes not only the presupposition that 
the conditions of in this can be taken un-
limit. thesis is nJso held 
that these conditions are reproducible or producible by human action on 
them without limit. These presuppositions rIf'",,"Iv need a reestimation of 
their content, think of all the objections concerning nature's behaviour as 
an organic \vhole~ as setting limits to human that mankind needs 
accommodation time to some basic natural that some natural 
conditions should be seen as unchangeable if human assets should be pre-
served, etc. The point is important for it attacks a thesis vvhich vIOuld base 
conditions of the freedom of mankind in the ca.pElclty of mankind 'to control 
or more, to reproduce and produce natural conditions of human life in an 
unceasingly advancing historical process. All this criticism is valid even 
'when it would be meaningful to control and reproduce old and produce 
new conditions in nature for the mankind vlithout any limit, 
A post-modern perspective for human life makes an emphasis on qual-
of life and post-material values, like preserving nature, instead of eco-
nomic and technological grovvth. It tries to give to consumption a different 
meaning from modernisation ideologies. Individual creativity is emphasized 
against standardisation of consumption. It does not accept a hierarchical 
structure for social life, based on the eminence of some, but requires democ-
racy and participation. Instead of accepting a strong order as a necessary 
consequence to utilising the main tools of modernism (like market econ-
omy, technological growth and science, among other elements), it tries to 
emphasise a much more 'playful' life as meaningful, exemplified in political 
decentering and in an everyday life, resisting the disciplining force of steady 
growth of effectivity. 
In my opinion the post-modernist perspective is a direct refusal of the 
modernist value system. In this quality of direct denial its cognitive tech-
nique is just reversing any sign in the opposed system. This can be helpful 
for concentrating on the needed changes as a mainly artistic visualisation, 
through contrasting old and new value systems but it is not immediately 
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translatable into a new rationality of action. The reason for this is that 
any continuity is missing from it, by the definition of its purpose and cog-
nitive technique. By that I mean that there is no coherent leading idea at 
present, upon which a new understanding of life, including a philosophy of 
technology can be based. 
The perspective of technological development which is currently gain-
ing ground is an eclectic mixture of modernism and post-modernism, in-
cluding some elements of post-modern requirements, taking into account 
of some post-material values. This perspective may be the consequence 
of 'negotiation', primarily realised on the market in form of changing con-
sumption habits, but it seems that it continuously needs a political power 
to make new requirements obvious and forceful. 
